Universities: Fundamental Tools for Democratization

Representatives of civil society organizations, governments, and academia gathered at the residence of Swedish Ambassador Jonas Hafström this week in recognition of the 20th Anniversary of the European Humanities University (EHU). Hosted by Ambassador Hafström and Lithuanian Ambassador Žygimantas Pavilionis, the event underscored the importance of freedom of academic expression and thought.

EHU is a university in exile; after Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus forced the university to close in Minsk, EHU relocated to Vilnius. It continues to serve students from Belarus through in-person and distance programs.

Students traveled to Washington to share their stories. They all spoke about the frustrations of living without freedom of expression – they described how if feels to have to censor your own visual art, your musical lyrics, your public remarks, and your written words. One student compared the regime to a paved sidewalk: it is unnatural, pushing down the flowers as they reach towards sunlight.

Speaking the language of freedom is perhaps easy to do from the back garden of an Ambassador’s residence in Washington. The difficult task now is to sustain support for EHU and its brave students, professors, and administration officials who fight repression simply by refusing to censor learning.

To learn more about EHU and how you can support its mission to promote liberal arts traditions in a free and democratic environment visit: http://www.ehufriends.org/

Before Condemning the Atrocities Prevention Board…

President Obama’s announcement of the Atrocities Prevention Board this past Monday sparked a shockingly negative response from the blogosphere; while the criticisms are prefaced with, “I do not condone genocide,” the knee jerk reaction to the APB’s creation is strikingly dire.

In Foreign Policy, Christian Caryl called it “Obama’s Committee of Salvation” with the tag, “preventing genocide sounds like a worthy cause. But setting up a new White House committee isn’t the way to do it.” Stephen Walt asked, “Is the Atrocities Prevention Board a good idea?” He concluded it to be a bad idea for three reasons: the tendency for the US to be the world’s police, an avoidance of addressing the real problem, and a somewhat oddly presented argument inferring that because the US is guilty of violence in its history it has no moral authority to speak up against genocide – ever. Michael Brenner framed his criticism differently in the HuffingtonPost writing, ”the resort to gimmickry creates the illusion of having done something significant when, in fact, tough judgments and decisions have just been kicked down the road.”

Seeking new ways to find creative solutions to address the most egregious human rights violations in history does not conflict with American values, as critics suggest, nor has the US lost the moral authority to act against genocide. In fact, it is because of our failures to act soon enough – in WWII Europe, in Bosnia, in Rwanda, and now in Syria – that we are compelled to recognize the significance of the APB’s creation. The US cannot be a global policeman but neither can it turn a blind eye to genocide while mouthing the words, “liberty and justice for all.”

Admittedly the APB could be unwittingly used by this or subsequent Administrations to give false hope to those who expect US intervention when in fact domestic political influences will prevent it. The APB cannot be an excuse for action if there is none: simply acknowledging a problem on paper does not fix it.

But the Atrocities Prevention Board can be a global mouthpiece for the best ideas in the area of genocide-prevention. It can result in substantive policy and programming recommendations designed to de-escalate violent situations. It can raise the collective consciousness of US officials, civil society activists, and business leaders, heightening their understanding of how and why large conflicts often smart with small acts.

It is easier to criticize an idea than it is to translate an idea into action: the APB exists now. Let it stand on its own merits before condemning it.

Barriers to Empowering Civil Society in Egypt

As protesters gathered by the thousands in Tahrir Square today, a small delegation of activists, academics, reporters, and policymakers convened at Freedom House to better understand the political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia.

Nancy Okail, Freedom House’s Cairo Office Director, argued strongly for continued international technical and financial support for Egyptian civil society. Okail, a defendant in the Egyptian government’s campaign against civil society activists, argued for popular engagement in political processes despite the personal price she and her fellow activists are paying. She also sharply criticized the international community’s recent actions.  Freedom House’s Middle East and North Africa Programs Director Charles Dunne joined her in noting that when the US paid the Egyptian government’s bail and the American NGO activists left Cairo, bilateral diplomatic leverage and international media interest followed closely on their heels.

“The Egyptian civil society felt very betrayed by the US,” she said, speaking to the fact that the US State Department approved a $1.3 million military assistance package three weeks after all but one of the American defendants departed. In releasing the funds, the State Department ignored calls to condition military aid around significant democratic benchmarks, such as the transition from military to civilian rule.

Okail, famously photographed on February 26 while reading George Orwell from the courtroom cage, argued that the Egyptian government is looking to criminalize, smear, and humiliate effective civil society activists by manipulating public opinion through media and by forcing the defendants to appear in court behind bars.  Further, as reported on April 17 by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “the Human Rights Committee of the Egyptian People’s Assembly has confirmed that a new draft Law on Associations and Foundations will be released in the coming weeks.” The new law is expected to make the situation worse for civil society engagement, not better.

While Okail affirmed that the SCAF “continue the trends that we have been seeing in the past,” under Mubarak, and the Islamist parties are “the NDP with beards,” she did offer a way forward: support legitimate media freedom and “move from a culture of impunity to rule of law.” In response to Charles Dunne’s poignant question about future prospects for liberal democratic reforms in Egypt, she noted that the elected Islamist parties could, in a “twisted way,” support a more liberal future: while they might be in power, protests reveal they are “not delivering.”

“People are asking: is democracy a process or an outcome?” said Fathi Zabaar, Project Director for Freedom House’s Tunisia office. The panelists made clear that Egypt’s government is putting both democratic processes and outcomes in jeopardy by stifling the legitimate voices of civil society actors. The State Department, particularly one advocating for civilian security, democracy, and implementation of the QDDR, might well consider the damaging effects of speaking in solidarity with civil society activists while simultaneously funding a government that represses them.

What Happened to our Russia Policy?

The democracy promotion and human rights communities lauded the State Department’s dealings with Russia at the end of 2011. Secretary Clinton provided a strong and immediate response recognizing the flawed Duma elections; congressional testimony by Assistant Secretary Phillip Gordon and Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Melia articulated a thoughtful dual-track policy that was both principled and pragmatic (“principled and purposeful” as Melia stated). The policy as articulated recognized the political rights and civil liberties of the Russian people while noting the many very practical reasons for maintaining a positive relationship with Russia. A beautifully crafted policy, it pleased democrats, human rights defenders, and realists alike.

So what happened after the Presidential elections in Russia and why did President Obama’s White House backtrack last week on what seemed to be a nuanced, win-win dual-track policy? Could it have anything to do with Russia’s recent announcement that NATO could use a Russia air base to transfer needed ”non-lethal supplies and personnel” to Afghanistan?

While videos of fraudulent voting in the Russian Presidential election went viral, the State Department chose to issue a statement that balanced a principled, pragmatic approach, noting that while the result indicated an electoral majority for Putin, the elections were problematic:

“The United States endorses the preliminary report of the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and welcomes the many other assessments of the Russian presidential election by Russian election monitors. We note the statement by the head of delegation for PACE that the election had a clear winner with an absolute majority. We also note, however, the OSCE’s concerns about the conditions under which the campaign was conducted, the partisan use of government resources, and procedural irregularities on election day, among other issues.” The statement continues, “We urge the Russian Government to conduct an independent, credible investigation of all reported electoral violations.”

Yet the White House statement, in full below, offers no recognition of principled engagement. In fact, it harkens back to the much-criticized “reset” policy. Further, the final sentence agreeing to “remove obstacles to better relations” indicates a potential backtracking in US support for free and fair elections in Russia. Backsliding that could be taken as a rubber stamp for Putin’s regime to target civil society actors fighting for human and political rights, such as Alexei Kozlov and Olga Romanova.

“President Obama called Russian President-elect and Prime Minister Putin to congratulate him on his recent victory in the Russian Presidential election.  President Obama highlighted achievements in U.S.-Russia relations over the past three years with President Medvedev, including cooperation on Afghanistan, the conclusion and ratification of the START agreement, Russia’s recent invitation to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and cooperation on Iran.  President Obama and President-Elect Putin agreed that the successful reset in relations should be built upon during the coming years.  The President said that he looked forward to hosting President-Elect Putin at the G-8 Summit in May at Camp David.  The two leaders outlined areas for future cooperation, including strengthening trade and investment relations arising out of Russia’s pending accession to the WTO. President Obama and President-Elect Putin agreed to continue discussions on areas where the United States and Russia have differed, including Syria and missile defense. President Obama and President-Elect Putin agreed to continue their efforts to find common ground and remove obstacles to better relations.”

It appears to an outside observer that the White House traded an air base for NATO in exchange for just ignoring the voices of Russian activists calling for a free, fair, and democratic elections – and a free, fair, and democratic Russia. Let’s hope that is not the case.

Carothers Releases “Democracy Policy Under Obama” Report – And How it Relates to Democracy Education at Home

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a panel discussion this week to highlight a new report written by Thomas Carothers entitled Democracy Policy Under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat. Carothers argues that unlike in the three previous presidential administrations, there is not an overarching democracy promotion narrative in President Obama’s administration.  He writes, “this absence of a central narrative, and one in which democracy promotion would have a natural place, is not a failing of President Obama and his foreign policy team. Rather, it is a reflection of the state of the world.” He also argues that “the unevenness of Obama’s commitment to democracy abroad is more a continuation of decades-long pattern then a change or retreat…In fact, the United States remains the most active and important supporter of democracy in the world.” (Page 46 and 47, respectively). The report offers an important analysis of the state of democracy promotion, and should be mandatory reading for anyone who supports “prodemocracy diplomacy” abroad and democracy strengthening here in the United States.

While I would argue that it is too soon to make the judgment that there is not a dominant narrative, it is important to unpack Carothers’ premise – for both foreign and domestic policy.

He divides his report into dominant phases, noting that the Obama administration initially stepped back from using the rhetoric of the Bush years while approaching foreign policy with “strong pragmatic instincts – a wariness of overstatement, a disinclination to lead with ideology, and the desire to solve problems through building consensus rather than fostering confrontation” (12). This lead many to criticize the administration’s lack of support for democracy promotion, despite the fact that foreign assistance funding for democracy, human rights, and governance did not drop in the FY09 and FY10 budgets (12; 19). Carothers notes that the administration “began to engage more actively on democracy promotion starting in the second half of 2009” for four primary reasons:

1. The Administration filled key foreign policy posts, including the Assistant Secretary position at DRL;

2. The Administration began responding to critics who argued that a “cooling-off” period for democracy promotion amounted to withdrawing support for it;

3. In response to unfolding events in the world, including the Presidential crisis in Honduras, election violence in Cote D’Ivoire, and protests across the Arab world;

4. A lack of results from direct engagement with non-democratic regimes “reduced the inhibitions of many administration officials about speaking bluntly on democracy and human rights in these places” (15 – 16).

One of the most important arguments Carothers makes is given short shrift – the importance of maintaining a functioning, representative democracy at home. Admittedly this was not the focus of his report, but he does address it at the end, noting that to effectively engage in this work, the United States must, “above all, never los[e] sight of the powerful connection between the health of democracy in the United States and the credibility and power of U.S. democracy promotion abroad” (48). His observation is critical, especially when examining the administration’s track record on “democracy promotion” at home.

In the first two budgets submitted by the President to Congress, the Obama administration did not include funding for the congressionally authorized Education for Democracy Act, which at that time funded domestic civic education programming in all 50 states and in more than 70 countries. While congress chose to appropriate funds to the Act in FY09 and FY10, by the time the Administration found its footing and came out in support of competitive funding for civics in FY11 and FY12, appropriators were cutting huge amounts from the federal budget, not adding new, unauthorized programming. While the domestic civic education community remains divided on the best mechanism to fund civic education – directed or competitive – there is consensus that federal funding is needed, especially as state and local governments continue to cut education funding under the auspices of austerity.

Carothers’ claim that the administration initially stepped back from democracy promotion can be applied to domestic policy, particularly democracy education. While the administration has stepped up high-level rhetoric, most notably by organizing events like the White House “Conversation on Education’s Role in Strengthening Democracy and Developing 21st Century Citizens” on January 10, 2012,  the lackluster support for civic education funding has been troubling. The FY11 appropriations legislation cut $21.5 million to domestic civic education and $5 million to international democracy education programming, a small amount of money overall, but funding that was consistent with the administration’s foreign policy support for civil society inclusion, primarily reaching civil society organizations, schools, teachers, and youth abroad. To my knowledge, funding was neither reinstated in FY12 for directed civic education nor added for new competitive grants, resulting in $43 million in cuts to domestic civic education over two years in the United States.

The Carothers report will continue to inspire conversation in broader foreign policy circles about the nature of democracy promotion. The health of US democracy, however, relies on citizens’ willingness to conduct civil debates on controversial issues and to understand from a young age that while our system is based on protecting individual rights, if we are to maintain that system, we must share in the responsibility of promoting the common good and the rights of others. This includes providing adequate funding to ensure that our children are educated and our teachers are prepared. I hope that as this important conversation continues, it will also address the need for democracy education here at home.

Note: All citations refer to the report available here.  

Weakness Under the Auspices of Strength: Egypt and the NGOs

“You can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time has come.”  -Victor Hugo

The Egyptian security sector raid on international democracy and human rights organizations working in Egypt has been widely criticized by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union. While the military has reportedly assured the United States that the property will be returned to the NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and Freedom House, the raids themselves – especially raids on Egyptian NGOs that ought to be supported by the government not attacked by its representatives – mark a significant deviation from Egypt’s democratic trajectory. This comes on the heels of an already protracted election period, confusing electoral process, and potentially  questionable military involvement in the selection process of a constitution writing committee.

On the raid, Al Jazeera English reported:

Freedom House’s Executive Director David Kramer expressed concern for Egypt’s democratic future in the Washington Post and on the Freedom House blog, calling on the government to take a series of immediate actions: ”Egyptian authorities must return confiscated property; permit the reopening of all offices of NGOs closed in the raids; and allow the unfettered operation of local and international NGOs as they work to expand respect for human rights and help the Egyptian people’s efforts to form a more just, open and democratic political system. Until those steps, at a minimum, are taken, the hope that arose in Egypt this year will be lost for good.”

NDI’s website, noting the organization was “deeply troubled” by the raids, also carried a concern voiced by President Kenneth Wollack: “Cracking down on organizations whose sole purpose is to support the democratic process during Egypt’s historic transition sends a disturbing signal.” IRI stated in English and Arabic that it is “confused,” having been invited (along with NDI) by the military regime  to witness Egyptian elections: “IRI is dismayed and disappointed by these actions.  IRI has been working with Egyptians since 2005; it is ironic that even during the Mubarak era IRI was not subjected to such aggressive action.”

Twenty-seven organizations in Egypt signed a letter condemning the military actions; the Egyptian news source Ahram reported the names of many of the signing groups. The international organizations, including the German political party foundation Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Freedom House, NDI, and IRI, could and did turn to their own democratic systems to seek redress. The Egyptian people are long overdue for democratic representation, for institutions that are accountable to the people and responsive to legitimate grievances. So while the security forces may have the strength to bombard the offices, they also showed their fundamental weakness: they fear the NGOs, NGOs fighting for the idea that all Egyptians deserve  fundamental freedoms and political rights. They fear an idea whose time has more than come.


U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security

The United States launched the  U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security on December 19. Watch Secretary of State Clinton describe the plan at Georgetown; in her written remarks she posed the question why we should care, and answered:

“you should care because this is not just a woman’s issue.  It cannot be relegated to the margins of international affairs.  It truly does cut to the heart of our national security and the security of people everywhere, because the sad fact is that the way the international community tries to build peace and security today just isn’t getting the job done.  Dozens of active conflicts are raging around the world, undermining regional and global stability, and ravaging entire populations.  And more than half of all peace agreements fail within five years. At the same time, women are too often excluded from both the negotiations that make peace and the institutions that maintain it.”

She describes the launch of a “Global Women’s Leadership fund” at USAID as part of the Elections and Political Processes Strengthening programming, as well as other efforts to raise awareness of women’s issues across embassies, missions, and other agencies. In addition, the effort has established “a mechanism for regular consultation with civil society representatives” and will require a review and update of the strategy in 2015.

More details are outlined by the White House, with a few sections pulled out below:

  • National Integration and Institutionalization: Through interagency coordination, policy development, enhanced professional training and education, and evaluation, the United States Government will institutionalize a gender-responsive approach to its diplomatic, development, and defense-related work in conflict-affected environments.
  • Participation in Peace Processes and Decision-making: The United States Government will improve the prospects for inclusive, just, and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women’s rights and effective leadership and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, transitional processes, and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments.
  • Protection from Violence: The United States Government will strengthen its efforts to prevent – and protect women and children from – harm, exploitation, discrimination, and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons, and to hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.
  • Conflict Prevention: The United States Government will promote women’s roles in conflict prevention, improve conflict early-warning and response systems through the integration of gender perspectives, and invest in women and girls’ health, education, and economic opportunity to create conditions for stable societies and lasting peace.
  • Access to Relief and Recovery: The United States Government will respond to the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crises, including by providing safe, equitable access to humanitarian assistance.

Hungarian Constitutional Court Annuls Law on Restricting Religions: Too Soon to Celebrate

An update to a previous post detailing potential backsliding of Hungary’s democracy through legislation that limits electoral representation and curbs religious and media freedom:

The Hungarian Constitutional Court annulled the law on restricting the number of registered religions on procedural grounds. However, as noted by the Hungarian Spectrum on December 18, this decision was expected: “According to people in the know, Fidesz’s plan is to make some very slight changes and resubmit the bill within a couple of days. By the time this revised bill gets back to the Constitutional Court, the Court will not hear it since all cases that were submitted before January 1, 2011, the date the new constitution goes into effect, will be thrown out. As they say in Hungary, they all go into the shredder. Actually, the Hungarians use “kuka,” a word for a special kind of garbage truck that was introduced in Hungary from Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. Gábor Iványi, the head of the Hungarian Methodists, called the plan the product of “evil cleverness.”‘

It is also reported that the Court ruled that the enacted media legislation unconstitutionally limits freedom of the press.

In an article published in the October 2011 Journal of Democracy, Lucan Way, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto compares the Eastern European democratic transitions to the “Arab Revolts.” While he makes a series of conclusions about the Arab world, he also makes the following claim regarding Russia: “Today, free media and competitive elections that had once seemed irreversible are no more than a distant memory.” (p22) Let’s hope Hungary can take necessary steps, including accepting the Constitutional Court’s decisions, to avoid continuing to follow Russia on a path away from democracy.

For information on Hungary’s democratic backsliding, Kim Lane Scheppele provides more details in today’s online New York Times.

FY12 Appropriations Legislation Passes Senate 67 – 32

The Fiscal Year 2012 Continuing Appropriations legislation passed the senate today 67 – 32.  Politico‘s David Rogers writes: “Overshadowed by the payroll tax fight — and largely dismissed in the press as another anonymous “year-end spending bill” — the measure may be seen with time as a real turning point.” He is also dead on in his analysis that funding priorities this year have a direct influence on what can and will be funded in future years. And while the NYTimes and most outlets are focused on the Payroll Tax Cut Extension, Rogers is right – the untold story is the passage of this enormous legislation, which, according to the summary provided by the House Appropriations Committee (majority), includes the following cuts:

“The Department of Education is funded at $71.3 billion in the legislation, which is $153 million below last year’s level and $9.3 billion below the budget request.”

Homeland Security – The legislation includes a total of $39.6 billion in regular discretionary funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – a decrease of $2 billion below last year’s level and $4 billion below the President’s request.”

“The conference agreement funds EPA at $8.4 billion, which is a $233 million reduction below the FY 2011 enacted level and $524 million below the President’s request. Overall, funding for EPA has been reduced by $1.8 billion (-18.4%) in calendar year 2011.”

Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) – The bill includes an advance appropriation for CPB for FY 2014 at a level of $445 million, or $6 million below the request. In addition, legislation requests a report on alternative funding sources for public broadcasting stations in lieu of federal funding.”

Government Accountability Office (GAO) – The bill contains $511.3 million in funding for the GAO, a reduction of $35 million below last year’s level and $45.6 million below the request. This funding level will continue GAO’s essential oversight work to provide Congress with an accurate reporting of the use of taxpayer dollars, while cutting spending in lower priority activities such as additional hiring, travel, and support contracts.”

Also of interest and consequence:

Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and Detainees – The bill includes a provision prohibiting funds to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees to or within the United States or its territories.”

“A ban on funding for needle exchange programs – a provision that had been included in the bill until FY 2010″

“A prohibition on the National Labor Relations Board  from implementing electronic voting procedures, preserving the integrity of the secret ballot election”

FY12 Appropriations Bill Expected to Pass Today: State and Foreign Ops Language

Implications for State and Foreign Ops Funding Priorities

The House appropriations committee (majority) provided the following summary of the legislation which is expected to pass this week to avoid a federal government shutdown. The full ”Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012″ legislation for State, Foreign Ops, and Related Programs is made available from the Senate Appropriations Committee website here.

In what is a rather bleak overall picture, there are a few rays of hope. The legislation summary recognizes “priority programs like global health and child survival, democracy promotion, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.” Recognition that democracy promotion is critical to foreign assistance matters, especially if it is a broader recognition that democracy promotion is not just elections (though support for electoral processes, as well as domestic and international election monitoring is critical as we saw in Russia last week).  Democracy promotion requires support for civil society, political party development, transparent and accountable governance, civic education, peace and reconciliation programs, minority protection and involvement, and other efforts that promote accountable governance, provide for equitable political representation, and encourage free and fair elections.

The summary indicates that there will be conditions placed on US assistance to Egypt, a priority that the think tank and NGO community involved in democracy assistance, in particular Michele Dunne and Stephen McInerney, have been advocating for as part of US support an Egyptian transition.

Quoted in full below from the State and Foreign Ops section starting on page 13 of the summary:

“State and Foreign Operations – The legislation provides $42.1 billion in regular discretionary funding for the State Department and foreign operations. This is more than $6 billion below last year’s level and $8.7 billion below the President’s request. The legislation also provides $11.2 billion in funding for civilian efforts related to Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT).

International Security Assistance – The bill provides $7.3 billion in discretionary funding for international security assistance, a decrease of $847 million from last year’s level and $953 million from the President’s request. The bill fully funds the $3.075 billion commitment in the United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, and supports international narcotics control and law enforcement, nonproliferation and anti-terrorism programs, peacekeeping operations, foreign military financing, and international military education and training. It also supports security initiatives in Mexico, Colombia, and Central America.

Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance – The legislation contains a total of $21.3 billion for bilateral and multilateral assistance, a decrease of $2.2 billion below last year and $4.9 billion below the President’s request. Reductions are taken in low-priority programs and countries, and support is continued for high-priority programs like global health and child survival, democracy promotion, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Export and Investment Programs – The bill supports continued operations of the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

State Department Operations and Related Agencies – The bill contains a total of $13.2 billion in discretionary funding for operational costs of the State Department and related agencies – a decrease of $2.6 billion below last year’s level and $1.8 billion below the President’s request. This includes funding for programs such as diplomatic and consular affairs, embassy security and operations, assessed contributions to international organizations, and international broadcasting.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Operations – The bill contains $1.3 billion for USAID – a reduction of $258 million from last year’s level and $476 million below the President’s request. The bill halts new foreign service hiring at USAID and assumes the closure of three overseas USAID missions.

Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism – The bill includes $11.2 billion in OCO/GWOT funding for the extraordinary and temporary costs related to programs and operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, counterterrorism activities, and refugee and humanitarian assistance in conflict zones. In Iraq, funds will support security forces and police training previously funded by the Department of Defense. Funds will also support civilian programs in support of the military’s counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

Important Policy and Oversight Provisions – The bill supports important policy provisions to ensure the respect for life around the globe and enhance oversight to bring about greater transparency and efficiency. For example, the bill:

Reduces the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) by $5 million below the FY 2011 funding level, which represents a 36% decrease over two years. The bill also retains language withholding funds dollar-for-dollar from UNFPA if they operate a program in China;

Ø Maintains long-standing pro-life riders, including the “Tiahrt Amendment,” which ensures family planning programs are voluntary; the “Helms Amendment,” which bans foreign aid from being spent on abortions; the “Kemp-Kasten Amendment,” which prohibits funds to organizations the President determines to support coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization; and the prohibition on Peace Corps funds being used for abortions;

Ø Directs that no HIV/AIDS funding be provided for needle exchange programs;

Ø Includes layers of conditions on direct assistance to foreign governments, requiring assessments, notifications, and annual reporting requirements;

Ø Conditions funds for the UN Human Rights Council and withholds 15 percent of funds for UN agencies until audits are made fully available to the United States Government and are published on a website;

Ø Requires additional congressional oversight before the Administration makes public announcements of multi-year funding pledges;

Ø Places conditions on aid to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority;

Ø Freezes base pay adjustments for Foreign Service officers for the second year in a row;

Ø Strengthens oversight of Global Fund programs, while maintaining last year’s funding level (including funds previously provided in the Labor-HHS Appropriations bill); and

Ø Requires that a number of transparency and performance reforms be met before the disbursement of additional capital to the multilateral development banks.”

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